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This paper examines the long-run determinants of the evolution of top in-
come shares. Using a newly assembled panel of 16 developed countries 
over the entire twentieth century, we find that financial development dis-
proportionately boosts top incomes. This effect appears to be particularly 
strong  during  the  early  stages  of  a  country’s  development.  Economic 
growth  is  strongly  pro-rich  which  is  inconsistent  with  globalized  labor 
markets determining the incomes of elites. Furthermore, international trade 
is not associated with increases in top incomes on average, but is so in An-
glo-Saxon countries. Finally, tax progressivity has a significant negative ef-
fect on top income shares whereas government spending has no such clear 
impact on inequality. 
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1  Introduction 
The relationship between inequality and development is a central issue in the study of 
economics. From fundamental concerns about whether markets forces have an innate 
tendency to equalize or increase differences in economic outcomes, to much debated 
questions about the effects of “globalization”, distributional concerns are always pre-
sent: Does economic growth really benefit everyone equally or does it come at the 
price of increased inequality? Is the effect perhaps different over the path of develop-
ment? Is it the case that increased openness benefits everyone equally, is it perhaps 
especially the poor that gain, or is it the case that it strengthens the position only of 
those who can take full advantage of increased international trade? Does financial de-
velopment really increase the opportunities for previously credit constrained individu-
als or does it only create increased opportunities for the already rich? What is the role 
of the state in all this? Theoretically such questions are difficult to resolve as there are 
plausible  models  suggesting  equalizing  effects  of  these  developments,  as  well  as 
models suggesting the opposite.
1 Empirically problems often arise because typically 
these effects should be evaluated over long periods of time and data is typically only 
available for relatively short periods.  
 
This paper empirically examines the long-run associations between income inequality 
and financial development, trade openness, the  size of government, and economic 
growth. The main novelties of our study lie in the uniquely long time period for which 
we have data and in the focus on top income shares. We use a newly compiled dataset 
for 16 countries, mostly developed economies, over the whole of the twentieth cen-
tury.
2 While previous studies have only had comparable data from the 1960s (at best), 
                                                 
1 Just to give some examples: one may distinguish between theories that predict markets to be innately 
equalizing, disequalizing or both (depending on initial conditions). Mookherjee and Ray (2006) give a 
useful overview of the literature on development and endogenous inequality based on such a division. 
Winters et al. (2004) give an overview of evidence on the relation between trade and inequality, Cline 
(1997) summarizes different theoretical effects of trade on income distribution, while Claessens and 
Perotti  (2005)  provide  references  for  the  links  between  finance  and  inequality,  presenting  theories 
which suggest both equalizing effects as well as the opposite. We will discuss some of the suggested 
mechanisms in more detail in Section 2 below. 
2 Even though the choice of countries is mainly a result of data availability it has some positive side 
effects. We are, for example, able to trace a fixed set of relatively similar countries as they develop 
rather than letting different countries represent stages of development. Having similar countries is also 
important especially when thinking about theoretical predictions from openness which are often dia-
metrically different for countries with different factor endowments, technology levels etc.   3 
our series start at the end of the “first wave” of globalization (1870–1913), continues 
over the interwar de-globalization era (1913–1950), the postwar “golden age” (1950–
1973) and ends with the current “second wave” of globalization.
3 Hence, in contrast to 
relying on shorter periods of broader cross-country evidence, our dataset allows us to 
study how inequality has changed over a full wave of shifts in openness as well as 
several major developments in the financial sector. In terms of the role of government, 
our long period of analysis implies that we basically cover the entire expansion of the 
public sector and the same is true for the role of income taxation, which was non-
existent or negligible at the beginning of the twentieth century.
4 Furthermore, by fo-
cusing on the top income earners (and concentration within the top) we can address a 
particular subset of questions regarding the extent to which economic development is 
particularly pro-rich.
5 This angle is of interest partly because there are theoretical ar-
guments for why some effects should be particularly beneficial for the rich, but also 
because recent studies of long-run inequality suggest that large parts of changes in top 
income shares are driven by changes in the very top of the income distribution.
6 
 
Our empirical analysis exploits the variation within countries to examine how changes 
in top income shares are related to changes in economic development, financial de-
velopment, trade openness and government size. As some theories suggest that the 
effects may be different depending on the level of economic development we also 
study this in more detail, allowing the effects to vary between different levels of per 
capita income. Furthermore, using a panel data approach allows us to take all unob-
servable time-invariant factors, as well as country specific trends into account.
7 
                                                 
3 As variously classified by, e.g., O’Rourke and Williamson (2000) and O’Rourke (2001). All of these 
studies discuss various aspects of globalization and inequality over these periods but they did not have 
sufficient data to analyze developments in detail. Cornia (2003) discusses differences in within-country 
inequality between the first and second globalization. 
4 In fact, the introduction of a modern tax system is typically what limits the availability of data on in-
come concentration.    
5  Most  of  the  previous  work  has  focused  on  broader  inequality  concepts,  in  particular  the  Gini-
coefficient, or (to a lesser extent) on the particular effects on the poor (e.g., Harrison, 2006; Beck et al. 
2007).  
6 Examples include, models of how aspects of these developments creates extreme returns to “super-
stars”, or models of capitalists and workers where capitalists benefit disproportionately would, when 
taken to the data, translate to isolated effects for a small group in the top of the income distribution. For 
evidence on much of changes in top income concentration stemming from the very top, see Piketty 
(2003), Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006), and Atkinson and Piketty (2007). 
7 As suggested by Piketty (2005), the new data coming out of the recent research on top incomes en-
ables more rigorous testing of mechanisms at play, and as he points out, even if this kind of analysis 
will always suffer from a severe identification problem the new data will allow testing of relationships 
which we have not been able to address before.    4 
 
Several findings come out of the analysis. First, we find that financial development, 
measured as the relative share of the banking and stock market sectors in the economy 
seems to increase top income shares. When interacted with the level of economic de-
velopment it turns out that the result derives from a strong effect in the early stages of 
development.  This  result  is  in  line  with  the  model  suggested  by  Greenwood  and 
Jovanovic (1990) where financial markets initially benefit only the rich but as income 
levels increase (and with them the development of financial markets) the gains spread 
down through the distribution. It is also of particular interest since a recent study by 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007) finds that financial development dispropor-
tionately benefits the poor.
8  
 
We also study the effect of various aspects of globalization on top incomes. When 
measuring globalization as the trade share of GDP we find no relationship on average, 
but we do find a strong association between increased trade and increased top incomes 
in Anglo-Saxon countries. The difference between the two groups is substantial: an 
estimated 50 percent of the difference in the development of top incomes since 1980 – 
a difference which has been emphasized in the top income literature – can be ex-
plained by the different responses to international trade.  
 
Another aspect of globalization that our results shed light on is the suggestion that the 
incomes of the elite is set on a global labor market, while all others have their incomes 
set locally. Our results suggest that this is not the case (at least not in any simple form 
of the argument). Assuming that domestic development determines wages on the local 
labor market while global growth determines the compensation for the elite, domestic 
economic growth (above the World average) should decrease inequality between the 
two  groups.
9  By  contrast,  our  results  suggest  that  increasing  GDP  per  capita  is 
strongly pro-rich. As we find this relation to be similar at different stages of economic 
development, it could indicate that recent findings of high productivity growth mainly 
                                                 
8 Note, however, that these findings are not necessarily conflicting. For example, both the poor and the 
richest group can benefit at the expense of the middle class. 
9 Gersbach and Schmutzler (2007) as well as Manasse and Turrini (2001) emphasize the distribution of 
incomes within the elite group (rather than the average) predicting that globalization leads to an in-
creased spread in incomes for the elite. Others such as Gabaix and Landier (2007) emphasis the firm 
size effect, while Kaplan and Rauh (2007) stress technological change, superstar effects (Rosen, 1981), 
and scale effects as plausible explanations for increasing top incomes.   5 
benefiting the rich in the U.S. postwar era (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2005, 2007), is a 
general phenomenon both across countries and across time.
10   
 
Finally our results indicate that government size only marginally lowers top income 
shares. Specifically, higher top marginal taxes have a robust, but fairly small negative 
effect on top income shares.
11 Government spending as share of GDP, however, has 
no clear effect.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines some common 
theoretical arguments linking the incomes of the rich and the variables included in the 
study. Section 3 describes the data and their sources while Section 4 provides a brief 
inspection overview of the relationships between the different variables. Section 5 
presents the econometric framework and Section 6 presents the main results and a 
number of robustness analyses. Section 7 concludes. 
2  Potential determinants of trends in top income shares 
A number of recent contributions to the study of income inequality have increased the 
availability of comparable top income data over the long-run. Following seminal con-
tributions by Piketty (2001, 2003) on the evolution of top income shares in France, 
series on top income shares over the twentieth century have been constructed for a 
number of countries using a common methodology.
12 The focus in this literature has 
mainly been on establishing facts and to suggest possible explanations for individual 
countries. To the extent that general themes have been discussed these have focused 
on accounting for some common trends such as the impact from the Great Depression 
and World War II (on countries that participated in it) and on the differences between 
Anglo-Saxon countries and Continental Europe since around 1980. Broadly speaking 
the explanations for the sharp drop in top income shares in the first half of the twenti-
                                                 
10 Note that what find is that stronger than average growth increases top income shares, not that growth 
in general has this effect.  
11 Atkinson and Leigh (2007c) find stronger negative effects of marginal taxation on top income shares 
in their study focusing on Anglo-Saxon countries. 
12 Other recent studies include Australia (Atkinson and Leigh, 2007), Canada (Saez and Veall, 2005), 
Germany (Dell, 2005), Ireland (Nolan, 2007), Japan (Moriguchi and Saez, 2006), the Netherlands (At-
kinson and Salverda, 2005), New  Zealand (Atkinson and Leigh, 2007), Spain (Alvaredo and Saez 
2006), Sweden (Roine and Waldenström, 2007) and Switzerland (Dell, Piketty and Saez, 2007). Much 
of this work is summarized and discussed in Atkinson and Piketty (2007).   6 
eth century have revolved around shocks to capital ownership, leading to the top in-
come earners losing much of the wealth that provided them with much of their in-
come, thus decreasing their income share substantially. High taxes after World War II 
(and the decades thereafter) prevented the recovery of wealth for these groups. After 
roughly 1980 top income shares have increased substantially in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries but not in Continental European countries. However, this has not been due to in-
creases in capital incomes but rather due to increased wage inequality (see Piketty and 
Saez, 2006 for more details on the proposed explanations for the developments).  
 
Even though a number of plausible explanations have been suggested in this literature 
it is fair to say that so far no attempts at exploiting the variation across countries and 
across time in an econometrically rigorous way has been made. In fact, in overviews 
(Piketty 2005 and Piketty and Saez 2006) of this literature it is suggested that – even 
though there will always be severe identification problems – cross country analysis 
seems a natural next step. A first question when contemplating such an analysis is, of 
course, what variables that could be expected to have a clear relationship to top in-
come shares. Beside variables suggested in the top income literature, such as growth, 
taxation and the growth of government, we think variables capturing financial devel-
opment and openness to trade, are especially interesting. 
 
The next question is; what should we expect these relationships to look like? When it 
comes to the impact of financial development, it is fair to say that standard theory 
typically predicts that financial development should decrease inequality, at least if we 
think of financial development as increasing the availability for previously credit con-
strained individuals to access capital (or that financial markets allow individuals with 
initially too little capital to “pool their resources” to be able to reach a critical mini-
mum level needed for an investment).
13 This is the standard mechanism in growth 
theories where a country can be caught in a situation where badly developed financial 
markets make it impossible for much of the population to realize projects that would 
increase growth (as, for example, in Galor and Zeira, 1993 and in Aghion and Bolton, 
1997). The situation would be one of low growth (compared to the country’s poten-
tial), high inequality and badly developed financial markets. With the development of 
                                                 
13 Recent evidence for financial development being pro-poor is given in Beck et al. (2007).   7 
financial markets, increased growth goes hand in hand with less inequality as the fi-
nancial markets improve the allocation of resources. A larger fraction of individuals 
are then given the possibility to realize profitable projects.  
 
There are, however, a number of suggested mechanisms that could turn this prediction 
around. In an overview of the links between finance and inequality, Claessens and Pe-
rotti (2005) give a number of references (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 2003 and Perotti 
and Volpin, 2004) to theory, as well as evidence, of financial development, which 
benefits  insiders  disproportionately  (consequently  leading  to  increased  inequality). 
The idea, in various garbs, is that understanding the potential threat to their position 
from certain types of development of capital markets, the political elites (implicitly 
the top income earners) would block such developments, possibly to the detriment of 
the economy. Hence, these theories agree that in principle the development of finan-
cial markets could have an equalizing effect but in practice only developments that 
disproportionately benefit the elite will materialize.  
 
Beside theories suggesting either increased equality or increased inequality from fi-
nancial development there are also a number of theories suggesting that financial de-
velopment, much like the classic Kuznets curve, leads to increased inequality in early 
stages of development but at later stages also benefits the poor, leading to increased 
equality. An influential article suggesting precisely this is Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990). Their idea is that at low levels of development when capital markets are non-
existent or at an early stage of development only relatively rich individuals can access 
the benefits of these (as there are certain fixed costs involved). At this stage further 
developments of financial markets increase growth but disproportionately benefit the 
rich. However, as the economy grows richer, a larger and larger portion of the popula-
tion will be able to access the capital market and more and more individuals will 
benefit. Consequently resource allocation improves even more, growth continues to 
increase,  but  now  accompanied  by  decreasing  inequality.  Eventually  the  economy 
reaches a new steady state where financial markets are fully developed, growth is 
higher and inequality has gone through a cycle of first increasing and then decreasing 
over the path of development. 
   8 
When it comes to standard trade theory the inequality effect of openness varies de-
pending on relative factor abundance and productivity differences, and also on the ex-
tent to which individuals get income from wages or capital. Easterly (2005) provides a 
good overview of the arguments, stressing the importance between differences (be-
tween countries) stemming from variations in endowments or productivity. Assuming, 
which seems realistic, that our sample contains countries that (over the whole of the 
twentieth century) have been relatively capital rich compared to the global average 
and are places where capital owners coincide with the income rich, we should, in gen-
eral, expect trade openness to increase the income shares of the rich in our sample.
14 
Even if theory is far from clear cut in its predictions, the basic argument that trade 
openness  may  “naturally”  benefit  the  rich  underlie  calls  for  political  intervention 
whereby a “loosing majority” could be compensated given that the total gains are 
large enough (as shown in Rodrik, 1997 and as recently forcefully argued in Scheve 
and Slaughter, 2007). 
 
Overall, the conclusion we draw from reviewing the literature on possible determi-
nants of top income shares is that theory provides us with many plausible alternatives. 
The main contribution we can make lies in using the uniquely long period for which 
we have data to test whether there are robust relationships over time as well as to ad-
dress issues of changing relationships along the path of development (such as testing 
whether financial market development has a different effect in early stages of devel-
opment compared to later stages).    
3  Data description 
This section outlines the data and their sources. Further details can be found in the 
appendix. The following variables are included in the analysis. 
 
Top income shares. In traditional income inequality research, top income earners have 
typically been defined as everyone in the top decile (P90–100) of the income distribu-
                                                 
14 An example of when this is not the case would be if differences between countries are due to produc-
tivity differences that are so large that the richer countries (the ones in our sample) can export labor 
intensive goods (productivity advantage offsets labor scarcity). Then trade would reduce inequality in 
the rich countries. Another potentially important point is the fact that these countries have largely 
traded with each other, and therefore the predictions could still be different for different countries in 
our sample.    9 
tion. The recent studies of Piketty (2001) and others have shown, however, that that 
the top decile consists of several highly heterogeneous groups of income earners that 
should be analyzed separately in order to reach as accurate conclusions as possible. In 
particular, the long-run evolution of the income share of the bottom nine percentiles 
of the top decile (P90–99) suggests a remarkably stable pattern over time whereas the 
the share earned by the top percentile (P99–100), by contrast, has fluctuated consid-
erably over the same period. Moreover, while labor incomes dominate in the lower 
group of the top decile, capital incomes are relatively more important to the top per-
centile. In order to analyze the determinants of top income shares in detail we will 
hence differentiate between the groups of income earners within the top decile.  
 
Our top income data come from a new international panel dataset over top income 
shares for 16 countries covering most of the twentieth century. These series are con-
structed by several researchers as parts of a joint methodological framework where 
the main source is the income statements in personal tax returns collected for different 
income classes, following Piketty (2001, 2003) and others.
15 The income reported in 
these sources is typically gross total income, which includes income from labor, busi-
ness and capital (and sometimes realized capital gains) before taxes and transfers. Top 
income shares are then computed by dividing the observed top incomes by the equiva-
lent total income earned by the entire (tax) population, had everyone filed a personal 
tax return. In most countries only a minority of the people filed taxes before World 
War II and the computation of reference totals for income regularly include both tax 
statistics and various estimates from the national accounts. For this reason the refer-
ence total income is likely to be measured with some error. Despite the efforts made 
to make the series as consistent and comparable as possible, one should be aware of 
that there are some known discrepancies in the data that could still create problems.
16  
 
                                                 
15  See the Table B2 in the Appendix for specific references and Atkinson and Piketty (2007) for de-
tails. 
16 Some differences in both income and income earner (tax unit) definitions remain. For example, real-
ized capital gains are excluded from the income concept in all countries except for Australia, New Zea-
land and (partly) the UK. Tax unit definitions vary even more. In Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, 
India and Spain they are individuals but in Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and 
the United States they are households (i.e., married couples or single individuals). Moreover, in Japan, 
New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom the tax authorities switched from household to indi-
vidual filing. In Germany there is a mixture of the two, with the majority of taxpayers being household 
tax units whereas the very rich filing as individuals. For a longer and more detailed discussion of these 
problems, see Atkinson and Piketty (2007, ch. 13).   10 
We employ three measures of top income share in order to mitigate some of these 
measurement problems. Our preferred measure is Top10_1, defined as the top percen-
tile income share (P99–100) divided by the income share of the next nine percentiles 
in the top decile (P90–99), i.e., P99–100/P90–99. We prefer this shares-within-shares 
measure since it cancels out the reference total income and hence eliminates the above 
mentioned measurement error associated with it.
17 Since the P90-99 income share has 
been relatively stable over time, the shares-within-shares measure is highly informa-
tive of the evolution of incomes in the top percentile. We also use Top1, the top per-
centile income share, since it is the most commonly used measure of income concen-
tration in the literature. Lastly, we compute a shares-within-shares measure for the 
absolute income top: Top10_01, i.e., the top 0.1 percentile income share (P99.9–100) 
divided by the rest of the top decile’s income share, P99.9–100/P90–99.9. 
 
Financial development. The challenge in estimating financial sector development over 
the whole twentieth century is to find variables that are available and comparable for 
all countries for such a long period. We therefore use three different measures aimed 
at capturing the relative importance of private external finance: Bank deposits (depos-
its at private commercial and savings banks divided by GDP), Stock market capitali-
zation (the market value of listed stocks and corporate bonds divided by GDP), and 
Total  market  capitalization  (the  sum  of  the  first  two,  which  is  also  our  preferred 
measure). The variable  Bank deposits is closely related to the measure of Private 
credit, used for example by Beck et al (2006), but is available for a longer time pe-
riod.
18 By using these three different measures, we are able to address possible distri-
butional differences between bank-based and market-based financial development. 
 
Our sources for bank deposits are Mitchell (1995, 1998a, 1998b) for the pre-1950 pe-
riod  and  International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS)  and  Financial  Structure  Database 
(FSD) for the post-1950 period. Data on stock market capitalization before 1975 come 
from Rajan and Zingales (2003), who present data for the years 1913, 1929, 1938, 
1950, 1960 and 1970. We linearly interpolate between these years (but not over the 
world wars) to get 5-year averages which we then link to post-1975 data from FSD. 
                                                 
17 To see this, note that P99–100 = IncTop1/IncAll and P90–100 = IncTop10/IncAll, which implies that 
Top10_1 = IncTop1/IncAll/(IncTop10/IncAll – IncTop1/IncAll) = IncTop1/(IncTop10 – IncTop1).  
18 For the country-years with overlapping data, the correlation between Private credit and Bank depos-
its is 0.82.   11 
One problem with the stock market capitalization measure is its potentially close con-
nection to our income measure, which includes capital income (although not realized 
capital gains), i.e., the rate of return on stocks and bonds owned by the rich. Hence, 
there could be a mechanical relation between top income shares and financial devel-
opment if, for example, dividends tend to be high when stock market capitalization is 
high. This potential problem is, however, considerably smaller in the case of bank de-
posits, which hence works as a robustness check in our analysis. 
 
Openness. Our measure of trade openness is standard and defined as the sum of ex-
ports and imports as a share of GDP. We use data on trade from Mitchell (1995, 
1998a, 1998b), Rousseau and Sylla (2003) and López-Córdoba and Meissner (2005) 
for the pre-1960 period and from IFS thereafter. 
 
Central government spending. In order to account for the activity and growth of gov-
ernment over the period, we include a measure of Central government spending, de-
fined as central government expenditure as a share of GDP. Data are from Rousseau 
and Sylla (2003). Ideally we would have liked to include both central and local gov-
ernments since the spending patterns at these two administrative levels may both vary 
systematically  across  countries  and  within  countries  over  time.  For  example,  the 
Swedish municipalities and counties has gradually taken over the state’s responsibility 
for the provision of traditional public sector goods such as health care and schooling, 
thereby potentially causing a decrease in central government spending but not in total 
government spending. However, lacking a measure of total government spending, we 
think that our chosen alternative is the best available measure for capturing the growth 
of government over time.
19  
 
Top marginal tax rate. We use statutory top marginal tax rates as our main source for 
measuring the impact of tax progressivity, and in a broader sense government activity, 
on top income shares. Ideally we would like to have data on actual marginal tax rates 
paid by top income earners instead of the statutory rates which have been binding to 
                                                 
19 Rousseau and Sylla (2003) use this variable in their study of the determinants of economic growth in 
an historical context. Central government spending to GDP is also the variable that is available in data-
bases such as the Penn World Tables, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and the IMF:s 
International Financial Statistics.   12 
varying degrees both across countries and within countries over time.
20 For a few 
countries such data are available thanks to previous efforts of researchers to calculate 
actual tax rates for different levels of incomes over time (Bach et al., 2005 for Ger-
many, Roine and Waldenström, 2007 for Sweden, and Kristian Rydqvist for Canada, 
Sweden, the UK, and the US). For this reason, we employ two variants of the mar-
ginal tax measure. First, topmtax1 consists of the statutory top marginal tax rates (ex-
cept for Germany and Sweden) and is our main concept because of the homogeneity 
in the measure across countries. Second, topmtax2 is based on the same data except 
for Canada, UK, Sweden and US in the postwar period where tax rates are calculated 
by Kristian Rydqvist for incomes equal to five times GDP per capita. Data on tax 
rates come for the most part from the different top income studies reported in Table 
A2, with a few complements drawn from OECD:s tax database. 
 
GDP per capita and Population. For the variables GDP per capita and Population 
size we use data from Maddison (2006). However, the shares of GDP calculated for 
most of the other explanatory variables use nominal GDP from Bordo et al. (2001), 
Mitchell (1995, 1998a, 1998b) and Rousseau and Sylla (2003).  
4  A first look at the data 
To get a sense of the relationships between our variables of interest it is useful to just 
look at the trends over time. After all, when it comes to some of the main findings in 
the individual country studies on top incomes, such as the effects of the Great Depres-
sion and World War II, these are apparent just from looking at the development. Fig-
ure  1  shows  the  development of  our  main  dependent variable,  Top10_1,  over  the 
Twentieth Century for all countries in our sample.  
 
Besides clearly showing the impact of the depression and World War II for many 
countries, another striking feature of the series is the strong common trend. With the 
exception of a few countries the development is remarkably similar over time, at least 
until around 1980. The same is, in varying degree, true for the main right-hand-side 
                                                 
20 For example, Roine and Waldenström (2007) shows for Sweden that over the entire century the top 
income percentile only paid a marginal tax rate equal to the statutory top rate in the years around 1980. 
More generally, the statutory top rates have been relatively more binding to larger groups of income 
earners in Scandinavia and the U.K than in, e.g., Japan or the U.S.    13 
variables (at least for the development of GDP/capita, top marginal tax rates and cen-
tral government spending). The panels in Figure 2 show the development of these 
since 1900.  
 
These signs of interdependencies are perhaps not so surprising given our focus on 
economies  that  been  relatively  closely  interconnected  through  events  such  as  the 
Great Depression affecting top incomes in many of these countries in similar ways. 
One may also think of broad policies (taxation, liberalization etc) or changes in tech-
nology (financial innovation, factor flows etc) to be reflected in common trends of top 
income shares across countries. In the extreme this could be a problem for our econo-
metric approach since we rely on within country changes in the relevant variables to 
identify effects, holding common trends constant. If there are changes across time in 
the explanatory variables but these are exactly the same everywhere, we would not 
find any effect even if there may be a relation. In other words, by taking out common 
trends, we run the risk of falsely rejecting a hypothesis because the patterns are too 
similar across countries. However, since no two countries are affected in exactly the 
same way by the developments throughout the 20th century, there should be enough 
variation in the data to disentangle the effects (see section 5 below). This problem is 
not unique to our study; exploiting the residual variation after having controlled for 
common effects is the standard way of approaching cross-country data.  
 
Can we by just looking at the data find any clear patterns between the top income 
shares and the proposed explanatory variables over time? The short answer would 
have to be no. As can be seen in Figure 2 the level of financial development is quite 
volatile up until the middle of the postwar period when it starts to increase. Trade 
openness, on the other hand, exhibits a more monotonic increase (except for the dras-
tic drop in the Netherlands during World War I), and a similar pattern goes for GDP 
per capita. Government spending is increasing in all countries, with the well-known 
war-related spike in the 1940s. Top marginal taxation increases before World War II, 
but continues to be high throughout the postwar period up to its peak around 1980 
when it mostly starts to decrease. Overall, there are no obvious links between any of 
these  variables  and  the  top  income  shares,  although  there  is  quite  notable  cross-
country variation to use in a more sophisticated analysis of the panel. Piketty (2005) 
makes a similar simple eyeballing exercise to provide some suggestive evidence on   14 
the inequality-growth links in the specific case of France, but in the end he concludes 
that “Using all countries in the database might allow to produce more convincing re-
sults”.
21 The natural next step, therefore, is to study these relationships more rigor-
ously. 
5  Panel estimations: Econometric method  
The theoretical discussion concerning the potential determinants of top income shares 
is suggestive, but inconclusive. Financial development has been suggested to increase 
as well as to decrease top income shares and the same goes for trade openness and the 
effect of economic growth. We do, however, expect to find that a larger government 
and higher tax rates (especially higher top marginal taxes) are associated with lower 
top income shares.
22 When it comes to finding possible relations between variables 
based on simply eye-balling the time series, we have concluded that there are no ob-
vious links to be suggested. We therefore proceed with panel estimates of the effects 
on these variables on top income shares. Panel estimations allow us to take all unob-
servable time-invariant factors into account. Further, it allows us to control for both 
common and country specific trends. Thus, we can test for specific hypotheses regard-
ing the relation between different variables on top income shares.  
 
When estimating the determinants of top income shares using a long and narrow panel 
of countries, the assumptions underlying the standard fixed effects model are likely to 
be violated. In particular, serial correlation in the error terms can be expected. We 
therefore apply the less demanding first difference estimator which relies on the as-
sumption that the first differences of the error terms are serially uncorrelated. This 
means that we start with the following regression: 
   
  1 it t i it y b g m e ¢ D = D + + + it X   (2) 
   
This is a standard first difference regression including fixed time effects gt and coun-
try specific trends (here captured by a country specific effect mi). Further, 
￿
Xit is the 
                                                 
21 Piketty (2005), p. 8. 
22 This is assuming that disincentive effects dominate. Some of the individual country studies on top 
incomes have found that higher marginal taxes have indeed lowered top income shares.     15 
vector of (first-differenced) variables that we are interested in as well as other control 
variables. Of course, the assumption of no serial correlation in the error terms does 
not necessarily hold, even after first-differencing. Indeed, some preliminary tests sug-
gest that serial correlation is a problem in this setting.
23  
 
To account for serial correlation, we follow two different strategies. First, we include 
the lagged dependent variable, thereby explicitly allowing for the dynamics that give 
rise to serial correlation. This means that we estimate the following regression: 
 
  0 1 1 it it t i it y b y b g m e - ¢ D = D +D + + + it X   (3) 
 
Applying the same test as above shows that serial correlation is no longer a problem 
when using a dynamic specification. However, the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable is not unproblematic since it is correlated with the unobserved fixed effects. 
Thereby, we could get biased estimates. This bias is reduced when T is large (Nickell, 
1981). T does in this case depend on the actual time horizon on which the data is 
based. In other words, in our case where T is 100 years, the bias is not likely to be a 
major problem even if we only use 20 periods based on 5-year averages. Furthermore, 
the standard way of dealing with the dynamic panel data problem is to use GMM-
procedures  along  the  lines  of  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  or  Arellano  and  Bover 
(1995).
24 But these GMM-procedures are not appropriate in a setting with small N and 
large T such as ours (Roodman, 2007). For these reasons we run regression (3) with-
out any adjustments or instrumentation.  
 
The second approach we use is to estimate (2) using GLS and thereby directly allow-
ing for country specific serial correlation in the error terms. Both when using dynamic 
first differences and first differenced GLS, we allow for heteroskedasticity in the error 
terms.  
 
                                                 
23 The test procedure follows Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 10.6): We run regression (2) and keep the 
residuals. We then rerun the regression and include the lagged residuals in the estimation. Since the 
coefficient on the lagged residual is positive and significant, we can conclude that serial correlation is a 
problem even after taking first differences. 
24 Lagged levels and differences of the endogenous variable/s are used as instruments.   16 
The fact that we control for trends and time invariant country factors does not mean 
that we have fully addressed potential endogeneity problems. First of all, we could 
have direct reverse causality from top income shares to our explanatory variables. 
This would be the case if, for example, top income shares would have a direct effect 
on economic growth, rather than the other way around. Similarly, high top income 
shares could affect financial development positively if individuals in the top of the 
income distribution are relatively prone to make use of the financial markets for sav-
ing and investment. It is more difficult to see a problem of reverse causality from top 
incomes to trade and government spending, but a high income concentration can of 
course affect the political trade-offs facing a government. This, in turn, can affect 
trade policies, government spending and how the tax system is structured. Second, it 
is possible that some uncontrolled factor affects both top income shares and the re-
spective control variables. This would then give rise to an omitted variable bias of our 
estimates.  
 
The ideal way of dealing with these endogeneity problems is to find some credible 
instrument for each respective explanatory variable. Since our approach here is to take 
an agnostic view on several potential explanations for top incomes over a long period, 
instrumentation is not feasible. Therefore, we will be analyzing partial correlations 
between top incomes and a set of explanatory variables, and we do not claim to estab-
lish causality. Rather, we regard our contribution as a first systematic take on the 
various explanations of top income shares that have been proposed in the literature.       
6  Results 
In this section, we report the results from panel regressions using the above estimation 
methods. Throughout, we use both dynamic first differences (DFD) and first differ-
enced GLS (FDGLS). As mentioned above, we include both country specific trends 
and time effects that control for common shocks across all countries. By first differ-
encing, we automatically control for all time-invariant country specific effects. We 
begin by looking at average effects over the whole period for all countries using dif-
ferent measures of financial development. We then allow for different effects across 
levels of development, differences between Anglo-Saxon and other countries, and fi-  17 
nally we show that our results are robust to using alternative measures of top incomes 
as well as restricting the sample in a number of ways.  
6.1  Main results 
Table 1 presents the results from our baseline regressions. The dependent variable is 
our preferred measure of income concentration, Top10_1, the ratio between the in-
come shares of the top percentile and the income shares of the top 90-99 percentiles. 
Odd numbered columns, (1), (3), (5) and (7) show results for the dynamic first differ-
ence (DFD) specification and the even numbered columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) the re-
sults for the first differenced GLS (FDGLS).  
 
In the first columns (1) and (2), the combined measure of financial development, To-
tal capitalization, is used and we also control for GDP per capita, population size, 
central government spending, and openness to trade. In columns (3) and (4) we use 
Bank deposits and in columns (5) and (6) Stock market capitalization to measure fi-
nancial development. We use these alternatives partly due to the potential problem of 
there being a rather mechanical relationship between the capital incomes of the rich 
and  stock  market  capitalization,  but  mainly  because  of  the  fact  that  Anglo-Saxon 
countries tend to have more stock market based financial systems, while most of con-
tinental Europe is more bank based (see for example Boot and Thakor, 1997, Allen 
and Gale, 2000, and Levine, 2005). Hence, differences between these measures would 
indicate a possible reason for the different developments of top incomes in Anglo-
Saxon and continental European countries respectively.
25  
 
These results show the existence of two clear relationships across all specifications. 
First, there is a strong positive relation between GDP per capita and top income shares 
suggesting that growth (in the developed world) has been “pro-rich” over the 20th 
century. The average 5-year change in per capita GDP is about 10 percent over the 
relevant time period. The point estimates of about 0.3, then indicate that the average 
change in per capita income is associated with a 0.03 increase in the income share of 
the top percentile. Given that the average value of Top10_1 is 0.38, this is a modest, 
                                                 
25 As mentioned above, this difference is one of the main findings in the recent research on top in-
comes. Indeed, the title of the recent volume edited by Anthony Atkinson and Tomas Piketty, collect-
ing much of this work is “Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast between European and 
English-Speaking Countries”.    18 
but non-negligible increase. The most plausible explanation for this finding is perhaps 
simply that the high income groups in society have a larger share of their income tied 
to the actual development of the economy. This means that in countries where growth 
is faster than the average, the rich get a larger than proportional share of this devel-
opment, thus causing growth to be pro rich.   
 
Second, we find that financial development on average is also quite strongly pro-rich. 
The average increase in Total capitalization in our data is about 0.1. An increase in 
Total capitalization of this size is according to our estimates associated with an in-
crease in top income shares by approximately 0.04. This is about a ten percent in-
crease from the mean top income share (0.38).
 26 
 
While both economic growth and financial development are robustly related to in-
creases  in  top  income  shares  across  the  specifications,  the  other  variables  seem 
equally robust in showing no significant relationship at all. Contrary to what is often 
asserted openness, i.e. the trade to GDP-ratio, is if anything negatively related to top 
income shares (significant only in the DFD specification in column 3). As we by in-
cluding time fixed effects control for any general changes in globalization it is of 
course  still  possible  that  “general  globalization”  increases  income  inequality,  but 
country specific trade openness does not. However, the mechanism behind such a re-
sult would be quite difficult to spell out. Furthermore central government spending 
does not appear to have an impact on top income shares. One possibility is that gov-
ernment spending is not strongly related to marginal taxes, especially top marginal 
taxes, at the same time as top marginal taxes could be what matters for top incomes.
27 
In columns (7) and (8), we therefore include statutory top marginal income taxes for 
the 11 countries that we have data for. While the point estimate of this variable is 
negative, it is not statistically significant. It should be noted that this is not due to the 
simultaneous  inclusion  of  taxes  and  government  spending:  dropping  government 
                                                 
26 Using Bank deposits, the size of the coefficients may look slightly lower but the average change in 
Bank deposits is much smaller than the changes in Total capitalization: 0.02 compared to 0.1. Thus, the 
size of the estimated effects is actually quite similar between the two variables. To be precise, the stan-
dardized coefficient is 0.25 for Total capitalization and 0.21 for Bank deposits in the DFD specifica-
tions 
27 Steinmo (1993) is an interesting account of how differences in not only the general tax level but the 
composition may matter especially for the rich. In particular he notes that the US and the UK had as 
high (or higher) top marginal taxes as Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s.  
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spending from the regression does not result in statistically significant effects of top 
marginal taxes. 
6.2  Different effects depending on the level of economic development 
As discussed in the theoretical discussion, the effect of several variables on top in-
come shares can be expected to depend on the level of economic development. In or-
der to analyze this possibility, we allow the effects to vary depending on the level of 
economic development. More precisely, we split the sample into three similar sized 
groups based on per capita GDP and then interact group indicators with the respective 
variable of interest. The results from this exercise are presented in Table 2.
28  
 
First, as can be seen in columns (1) and (2), there is little evidence that the effect of 
GDP growth on top incomes depends on the level of development. The point esti-
mates are only significant for the lowest income groups, but F-tests cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are equal for the different groups. 
 
When it comes to the effect of financial development depending on the level of eco-
nomic development this exercise indicates something interesting. According to the 
basic idea in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), financial development should benefit 
the rich relatively much when the level of economic development is low, but not when 
it is high. In columns (3) and (4), we see that this argument appears to be supported by 
the data. Using our preferred measure of top income shares, Top10_1, it seems that 
the positive impact of financial development on top income shares is due to its effect 
at low levels of economic development. In fact, F-tests reject both the hypothesis of 
similar coefficients between the low- and middle income groups, as between the low- 
and high income groups. 
 
Standard trade theory suggests that the effect of trade openness should vary depending 
on relative factor abundance. Basically, the relatively abundant factors of production 
are expected to benefit from increased openness, while the scarce factors are expected 
to lose. Since factor abundance is likely to be related to the level of economic devel-
                                                 
28 It should be noted that all countries that are included in this analysis are now at relatively high levels 
of economic development, while India, China and Argentina are not included.  This exclusion prevents 
a comparison between countries that are at the same level of economic development at very different 
time periods.   20 
opment, it is natural to analyze if the effect of openness on top income shares depends 
on the level of development. In columns (5) and (6), we find some indication of such 
a pattern. The point estimates of Openness are significantly larger in the low income 
group than in the high income group. This would indicate that increased trade tends to 
be generating relatively larger income disparities in poor countries than in rich, which 
goes  against  the  predictions  from  the  basic  Heckscher-Ohlin  trade  models,  but  is 
compatible with other trade based explanations. However, these effects are not statis-
tically significant and should hence not be emphasized. 
6.3  Are Anglo-Saxon countries different? 
Based on the different developments from 1980 and onwards, it has been suggested 
that the evolution of top income shares in Anglo-Saxon countries differs from that of 
continental Europe.
29 Empirically speaking, there are two possibilities: Anglo-Saxon 
countries may have had a different development in the underlying determinants of top 
income shares, or the response to the underlying determinants differs – for some rea-
son – between the two groups of countries. In Table 3, we address this issue by inter-
acting a dummy variable indicating that a country is Anglo-Saxon with the main vari-
ables of interest.
30 We can then directly answer the question if the slope coefficients 
differ between Anglo-Saxon and other countries.  
 
As can be seen in columns (1)-(4), there is no indication that economic growth or fi-
nancial development have a different relations to top income shares in the two coun-
try-groups. Again, this is evidence against the possibility that the type of financial sys-
tem (bank based or market based) has different distributional consequences.  
 
Openness to trade does, however, have a different impact on top incomes in the An-
glo-Saxon countries compared to the rest of the sample. While increased trade on av-
erage is not significantly related to top incomes, it is associated with a significant in-
crease in top income shares among the English speaking countries and the estimated 
difference is quite substantial. Consider the following back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tion. The average increase in Top10_1 since 1980 has been 0.15 among Anglo-Saxon 
countries, while it has been close to zero in the other group of countries. During the 
                                                 
29 Atkinson and Piketty (2007). 
30 Anglo-Saxon countries are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and the US.   21 
same time period, trade has increased by about 0.25 on average (there is no difference 
between Anglo-Saxon and other countries). As the slope coefficient is 0.3 on the in-
teraction term, approximately 0.3×0.25=0.075, that is about 50 percent, of the total 
difference between the groups can be accounted for by the different responses to in-
ternational trade. The underlying cause of these differences is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but the size of this effect certainly calls for further research.  
 
Another possibility that has been discussed in the literature is that the different groups 
of countries differ in their acceptance of inequality.
31 One, admittedly quite weak, 
way to test this hypothesis is to analyze if government spending is relatively pro-rich 
in Anglo-Saxon countries. In columns (7) and (8), we therefore interact government 
expenditures with the Anglo-Saxon indicator, but the interaction term is not statisti-
cally significant. We can therefore not see any indication that the distributional impact 
of government spending is different in the two country groups. 
6.4  Alternative measures and sample restrictions  
In this section, we analyze the robustness of the main result in three dimensions. First, 
we use alternative measures of top income shares. Second, we use various sample re-
strictions to make sure that our results are not driven by extreme observations. Finally, 
we use a somewhat different measure of top marginal taxes. 
 
We prefer the use of Top10_1 to measure top income shares because it is immune to 
the problems of correctly estimating the reference total for income. It is, however, not 
the only possible measure of top incomes. In Table 4, we therefore repeat the main 
analysis from above using the Top1 (columns 1-4) and Top10_01 (columns 5-8) as the 
dependent variables. Top1 has the advantage of relating top incomes to total incomes, 
(though this may come at the expense of measurement error). It also increases the 
number of observations. Top10_01, gives us the results for an even more extreme 
group in the uppermost tail in the income distribution.  
 
In columns (1) and (2) we see that using Top1 as our measure of top incomes, the re-
sults are essentially the same as before: there is a strong positive relation both be-
                                                 
31 See, for example the discussion in Piketty and Saez (2003).   22 
tween GDP per capita and financial development (Total capitalization) and top in-
come shares.
32 The estimated coefficient on financial development is roughly unity, 
which means that increasing financial development by one standard deviation is asso-
ciated with an increase in top income shares by about 0.5 percentage points (the mean 
of Top1 is around 9 percent).
33 The relation between openness to trade and top income 
is  negative,  and  the  coefficient  is  statistically  significant  in  FDGLS-specification. 
Again, the evidence thus points against trade being associated with increased inequali-
ties on average. The relation between central government spending and top income 
shares is insignificant is like before. However, adding top marginal taxes (columns 3 
and 4) to the above specification we now find a statistically significant negative rela-
tion between marginal taxes and top incomes. The coefficient indicates that an in-
crease in top marginal taxes by 10 percentage points (about one standard deviation) is 
associated with a 0.25 percentage point reduction in the top income shares. Since the 
average value of Top1 is about 9, this is a relatively small effect.
34    
 
Columns (5) to (8) reports the results when using the income shares of the top tenth of 
a percentile scaled by the income share of the 90–99.9 percentiles (Top10_01). The 
main results in columns (5) and (6) are similar to the ones before: the positive relation 
between economic growth and top incomes appear robust, as does the relation be-
tween  financial  development  and  top  incomes.  Using  Top10_01  as  the  dependent 
variable,  the  partial  correlation  between  top  incomes  and  government  spending  is 
negative and marginally statistically significant. In the final two columns (7) and (8), 
we add top marginal taxes and find that the effect of this variable is negative and sta-
tistically significant, but the estimated coefficient is now very small.   
 
In Table 5, we conduct a different set of robustness tests, based on various sample re-
strictions. In the first two columns we focus on the post World War II-period, and 
drop the observations prior to 1945. The main reason for this restriction is that this 
period included the great depression era, during which the volatility of growth rates 
                                                 
32 The results are similar when using Bank deposits or Stock market capitalization as proxies for finan-
cial development. 
33 Using Bank deposits rather than Total capitalization increases the sample size even further. The re-
sults are the same  
34 One oddity is that the partial effect of government spending on top incomes is positive when holding 
marginal taxes constant. The effect is of considerable size: increasing the share of government to GDP 
by 10 percentage points is associated with a 1.5 percentage point increase in top income shares.   23 
and changes in the income distribution were quite extreme. Further, top income shares 
declined rapidly during the Second World War, possibly for reasons unrelated to the 
economic forces we are analyzing. The main results are unchanged by this sample re-
striction.
35 Economic growth is robustly related to increases in top incomes, as is fi-
nancial development. In columns (3) and (4), we drop Japan. One reason behind this 
exclusion is that we do not have Top10_1 data for Japan, but only Top05_1. Another 
reason is that Japan integrated with the world economy quite late compared to the 
other countries in the sample. It is therefore possible that the evolution of top incomes 
were affected by other factors than in other countries. However, excluding Japan does 
not change the main results. 
 
Measuring top marginal taxes is not unproblematic and we here mainly rely on the 
series collected by researchers studying the evolution of top income shares. For a few 
countries – Canada, Sweden, UK and the US – we use more unified series of top mar-
ginal income taxes annually for the period 1950-2005. The correlation between the 
two series of top marginal taxes is 0.64 (in first differences). This is quite high, but we 
nevertheless replace the original tax data with the new series for the four countries 
where the new data is available, and re-run the regressions for the post WWII-period. 
In the first two columns of Table 6, we report the results for this time period using the 
original data and see that there is a negative relation between top marginal taxes and 
top income shares. In columns (3) and (4), we use the new series and see that the es-
timates are both larger and more statistically significant. A point estimate of about 
0.13 suggests that increasing top marginal taxes by 10 percentage points reduces the 
income share highest income earners (the income share of the top percentile relative 
to the income share of the 90
th – 99
th percentiles) by 1.3 percent. This is quite a small 
effect considering that the average income share of the Top1 group is 45 percent of 
the Top90-99 group.  
7  Conclusions  
This paper set out to empirically analyze the long-run relationships between top in-
come shares and financial development, trade openness, the size of government, and 
                                                 
35 The change in the umber of observations between the two samples is larger when using Bank depos-
its to measure financial development. The results are, however, similar using this measure.   24 
economic growth. While these relationships, of course, have been extensively studied 
before, the unique contribution of this paper lies in the long time period for which we 
have data. Combining findings from a number of recent studies on top incomes with 
other historical data, our results are based on developments over the whole of the 
twentieth century. Using a panel data approach allows us to take all unobservable 
time-invariant factors, as well as country specific trends into account. 
 
Two findings stand out as being significant and robust across all specifications. First, 
economic growth seems to have been pro-rich over the Twentieth Century. More pre-
cisely, in times when a country has grown faster than average, top income earners 
have benefited more than proportionally. A likely reason for this result is simply that, 
top incomes are (and have been) more closely related to actual performance than in-
comes on average. This result is similar at different levels of development and is not 
different between Anglo-Saxon and other countries. Second, we also find financial 
development to have been pro-rich over the twentieth century. This effect is also simi-
lar in Anglo-Saxon countries and elsewhere, it does not depend on whether financial 
development is proxied using bank deposits or stock market capitalization (often said 
to be a difference between Continental Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries), but it 
seems to depend on economic development. In line with the model in Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) we find that the effect is strongest at relatively low levels of eco-
nomic development. 
 
When it comes to the much debated distributional effects of trade openness we do not 
find any evidence of this being disproportionately beneficial for top income earners 
on average. If anything the relationship is negative in some specifications. However, 
here there is a difference across groups of countries. Increased trade is associated with 
increased top incomes in Anglo-Saxon countries; but not in continental Europe. The 
difference is large enough to explain a substantial part of the different development of 
top incomes in the two country groups since 1980. While we can only speculate about 
the causes behind these different responses to trade, it is possible that labor market 
institutions might play a role.
36  
                                                 
36 As has been documented by Botero et al (2004), countries of English legal origin have weaker em-
ployment protection, weaker trade unions, and weaker social security laws. All of these can affect the 
impact of trade on the distribution of income.   25 
 
Finally, government spending has no clear effect on inequality but the degree of tax 
progressivity in the top of the distribution seems to have a significantly negative effect 
on top income shares. The size of the effect is, however, fairly small. This suggests 
that government policies are relatively ineffective in reducing inequality by lowering 
the income shares of the top income earners. 
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Table 1. The determinants of top income shares 










  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS 
                 
￿ gdppc  0.293***  0.284***  0.242***  0.184***  0.303***  0.275***  0.328***  0.327*** 
  (0.098)  (0.052)  (0.080)  (0.040)  (0.10)  (0.054)  (0.104)  (0.052) 
￿ pop  –0.681*  –0.232  0.0886  0.106  –0.634  –0.203  –0.815  –0.574** 
  (0.35)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.11)  (0.38)  (0.22)  (0.37)  (0.22) 
￿ cgov  0.0257  –0.101  –0.116  –0.207  0.0215  –0.135  0.26  0.133 
  (0.27)  (0.18)  (0.27)  (0.17)  (0.27)  (0.18)  (0.35)  (0.18) 
￿ topmtax              –0.0007  –0.0005 
              (0.0007)  (0.0003) 
￿ open  0.0414  –0.00704  –0.130**  –0.0660  0.0665  0.0174  0.005  –0.049 
  (0.13)  (0.085)  (0.065)  (0.048)  (0.082)  (0.086)  (0.14)  (0.09) 
￿ totcap  0.0447**  0.0333***          0.067***  0.056*** 
  (0.019)  (0.011)          (0.019)  (0.012) 
￿ bankdep      0.132**  0.0982***         
      (0.051)  (0.028)         
￿ smcap          0.0307*  0.0276**     
          (0.017)  (0.013)     
￿ top10_1(lag)  0.0616    0.0263    0.0620    0.0404   
  (0.14)    (0.13)    (0.14)    (0.17)   
                 
Country trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs  106  109  130  140  108  109  90  92 
No countries  14  13  14  14  13  13  11  11 
R-squared  0.71    0.63    0.69    0.72   
The dependent variable is the income share of the top percentile divided by the income share of the 
90th to 99th percentiles. DFD stands for dynamic first differences, while FDGLS stands for first differ-
enced GLS. FDGLS estimations allow for country specific AR(1) processes. Both DFD and FDGLS 
allow for heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 2. The effects at different levels of economic development 
 





￿  top10_1 
￿ top10_1 
￿ top10_1 
  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS 
 
 
Level of development ×  
￿ GDP per capita 
Level of development ×  
￿ Total capitalization 
Level of development ×  
￿ Openness 
             
low inc × X  0.329**  0.321***  0.211***  0.161***  0.399  0.213 
  (0.12)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.036)  (0.55)  (0.16) 
med inc × X  0.271***  0.236***  0.0301*  0.0263*  0.219  0.0905 
  (0.096)  (0.067)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.16)  (0.12) 
high inc × X  0.162  0.143*  0.0300  0.00791  –0.0753  –0.110 
  (0.14)  (0.084)  (0.024)  (0.016)  (0.12)  (0.092) 
             
￿ pop  –0.665*  –0.255  –0.948**  –0.553**  –0.619*  –0.252 
  (0.37)  (0.22)  (0.37)  (0.24)  (0.33)  (0.21) 
￿ cgov  –0.0418  –0.185  0.184  0.0143  –0.143  –0.177 
  (0.30)  (0.18)  (0.27)  (0.17)  (0.29)  (0.18) 
￿ totcap  0.0466**  0.0350***      0.0471**  0.0373*** 
  (0.020)  (0.012)      (0.019)  (0.011) 
￿ gdppc      0.276***  0.258***  0.286***  0.262*** 
      (0.090)  (0.051)  (0.098)  (0.053) 
￿ open  0.0284  –0.0115  0.0947  0.0426     
  (0.13)  (0.084)  (0.13)  (0.086)     
￿ top10_1(lag)  0.0509    0.0592    0.0643   
  (0.16)    (0.12)    (0.16)   
             
             
Test Low=Medium  0.18  1.87  9.95***  12.56***  0.11  0.53 
Test Low=High  1.38  4.39**  10.14***  16.30***  0.80  3.84** 
Test Medium=High  1.13  1.51  0.00  0.82  4.37**  3.11* 
             
Country trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs  106  109  106  109  106  109 
No of countries  14  13  14  13  14  13 
R-squared  0.71    0.74  .  0.72   
Interactions  between  low,  medium  and  high  GDP  per  capita  and 
￿ GDP  per  capita, 
￿ totcap,  and 
￿ openness. DFD stands for dynamic first differences, while FDGLS stands for first differenced GLS. 
FDGLS estimations allow for country specific AR(1) processes. Both DFD and FDGLS allow for het-
eroskedasticity in the error terms. Tests are F-tests of equality of coefficients. Standard errors in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3. Are Anglo-Saxon countries different?  
 











  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS 
 
 
Anglo-Saxon ×  
￿ GDP per capita 
Anglo-Saxon ×  
￿ Total capitalization 
Anglo-Saxon ×  
￿ Openness 
Anglo-Saxon ×  
￿ Cgov 
                 
￿ gdppc  0.279**  0.259***  0.291***  0.286***  0.262***  0.281***  0.296***  0.282*** 
  (0.12)  (0.058)  (0.099)  (0.052)  (0.094)  (0.051)  (0.100)  (0.053) 
Anglo-Saxon ×   0.0519  0.0504             
￿ gdppc  (0.12)  (0.067)             
￿ totcap  0.045**  0.034***  0.029  0.016  0.042**  0.032***  0.046**  0.033*** 
  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.012) 
Anglo-Saxon ×       0.0245  0.0231         
￿ totcap      (0.022)  (0.016)         
￿ open  0.0621  0.00701  0.0611  0.0186  -0.0401  -0.0621  0.0208  -0.00151 
  (0.13)  (0.087)  (0.13)  (0.085)  (0.14)  (0.092)  (0.14)  (0.088) 
Anglo-Saxon ×          0.317**  0.265**     
￿ open          (0.15)  (0.11)     
￿ cgov  0.0321  -0.0819  -0.00379  -0.125  -0.0273  -0.0357  -0.0309  -0.0830 
  (0.27)  (0.17)  (0.27)  (0.17)  (0.26)  (0.17)  (0.28)  (0.20) 
Anglo-Saxon ×              0.244  -0.0440 
￿ cgov              (0.38)  (0.27) 
￿ pop  -0.681*  -0.283  -0.686*  -0.267  -0.583*  -0.100  -0.685*  -0.229 
  (0.35)  (0.22)  (0.35)  (0.22)  (0.34)  (0.22)  (0.35)  (0.22) 
￿ top10_1(lag)  0.0819    0.0567    0.0740    0.0614   
  (0.18)    (0.14)    (0.14)    (0.14)   
                 
                 
Country trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs  106  109  106  109  106  109  106  109 
No of countries  14  13  14  13  14  13  14  13 
R-squared  0.71    0.71  .  0.72    0.71   
Interactions between a dummy for Anglo-Saxon countries and 




￿ cgov. The dependent variable is the income share of the top percentile divided by the income 
share of the 90th to 99th percentiles. DFD stands for dynamic first differences, while FDGLS stands for 
first differenced GLS. FDGLS estimations allow for country specific AR(1) processes. Both DFD and 
FDGLS allow for heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.   33 
Table 4. Alternative measures of top income shares 
 










  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS 
                 
￿ gdppc  6.026***  5.766***  6.691***  6.27***  0.0572**  0.0713***  0.071***  0.076*** 
  (1.85)  (1.03)  (1.59)  (1.31)  (0.026)  (0.016)  (0.027)  (0.016) 
￿ pop  –14.15  –4.619  –5.552  –4.356  –0.147  –0.0574  –0.169*  –0.132* 
  (8.99)  (5.03)  (8.14)  (5.25)  (0.10)  (0.069)  (0.099)  (0.074) 
￿ cgov  5.290  5.767  15.66**  13.001***  –0.133*  –0.110**  –0.041  –0.006 
  (7.63)  (4.62)  (7.42)  (4.97)  (0.078)  (0.056)  (0.10)  (0.06) 
￿ topmtax      –0.028**  –0.021**      –0.0003*  –0.0002** 
      (0.013)  (0.009)      (0.0002)  (0.0001) 
￿ open  –7.187  –8.833***  –8.385  –8.395***  0.0141  0.0209  0.0211  0.006 
  (4.57)  (2.26)  (5.21)  (2.51)  (0.036)  (0.028)  (0.039)  (0.03) 
￿ totcap  1.045*  0.985***  1.608***  1.276***  0.0101**  0.0081**  0.012**  0.012*** 
  (0.56)  (0.32)  (0.55)  (0.32)  (0.0049)  (0.0037)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Lagged dep.  –0.0262    –0.0904    0.238**    0.253*   
variable  (0.12)    (0.11)    (0.11)    (0.135)   
                 
Country trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs  123  126  101  103  106  109  90  92 
No of countries  15  14  12  12  14  13  11  11 
R-squared  0.54    0.62    0.75    0.76   
The dependent variable in columns (1)–(4) is the income share of the top percentile. In columns (5)-(8) 
it is the share of the top 0.1 percentile relative to the income share of the top 90-99.9 percentiles. DFD 
stands for dynamic first differences, while FDGLS stands for first differenced GLS. FDGLS estima-
tions allow for country specific AR(1) processes. Both DFD and FDGLS allow for heteroskedasticity 
in the error terms. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5. Sample restrictions 
 






  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS 
  Pre 1945 excluded  Japan excluded 
         
￿ gdppc  0.294**  0.265***  0.456***  0.402*** 
  (0.12)  (0.057)  (0.12)  (0.060) 
￿ pop  –0.683*  –0.309  –0.559  –0.135 
  (0.35)  (0.23)  (0.41)  (0.23) 
￿ cgov  0.0161  –0.194  0.0303  0.0447 
  (0.26)  (0.18)  (0.28)  (0.18) 
￿ open  0.0322  0.00474  0.0592  –0.0160 
  (0.13)  (0.090)  (0.13)  (0.091) 
￿ totcap  0.0450**  0.0348***  0.0463**  0.0369*** 
  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.012) 
￿ top10_1(lag)  0.0539    0.123   
  (0.18)    (0.14)   
         
         
Country trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs  102  103  96  99 
No of countries  14  13  13  12 
R-squared  0.63    0.75   
The dependent variable is the income share of the top percentile divided by the income share of the 
90th to 99th percentiles. DFD stands for dynamic first differences, while FDGLS stands for first differ-
enced GLS. FDGLS estimations allow for country specific AR(1) processes. Both DFD and FDGLS 
allow for heteroskedasticity in the error terms. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Alternative measure of top marginal taxes 
 






  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS 
  topmtax1  topmtax2 
         
￿ gdppc  0.353***  0.346***  0.357***  0.357*** 
  (0.12)  (0.061)  (0.12)  (0.062) 
￿ pop  –0.803**  –0.601***  –0.887**  –0.654*** 
  (0.36)  (0.22)  (0.36)  (0.22) 
￿ cgov  0.227  0.0700  0.237  0.115 
  (0.35)  (0.19)  (0.34)  (0.19) 
￿ topmtax1  –0.0908  –0.0860**     
  (0.072)  (0.037)     
￿ topmtax2      –0.138*  –0.146*** 
      (0.079)  (0.045) 
￿ open  –0.0359  –0.0725  –0.0445  –0.0622 
  (0.14)  (0.094)  (0.14)  (0.093) 
￿ totcap  0.0694***  0.0589***  0.0707***  0.0623*** 
  (0.020)  (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.012) 
￿ top10_1(lag)  –0.0012    –0.0144   
  (0.20)    (0.20)   
         
         
Country trends  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs  86  87  86  87 
No of countries  11  11  11  11 
R-squared  0.64    0.64   
Notes: The dependent variable is the income share of the top percentile divided by the income share of 
the 90th to 99th percentiles. DFD stands for dynamic first differences, while FDGLS stands for first 
differenced  GLS.  FDGLS  estimations  allow  for  country  specific  AR(1)  processes.  Both  DFD  and 
FDGLS allow for heteroskedasticity in the error terms. topmtax1 consists of mainly statutory top mar-
ginal tax rates while topmtax2 uses marginal tax rates on incomes equal to five times GDP per capita 
(data collected by Kristian Rydvist) for Canada, Sweden, UK and US. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Source: See Table A2. 
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Figure 2: Variables included in the regression analysis, all countries, 1900–2000. 
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 Appendix 
Table A1: Variable definition 
 
Variable  Variable definition  Source 
Top10_1  Share of top 10% income share earned by 
those with the 1% of highest incomes. 
See Table A2. 
Top1  Share of total income earned by those with the 
1% highest incomes. 
See Table A2. 
Top10_01  Share of top 10% income share earned by 
those with the 0.1% of highest incomes. 
See Table A2. 
totcap  Total capitalization: Sum of Bank deposits 
and Stock market capitalization 
-1950: Mitchell, RZ, Bordo; 
1950-: IFS, FSD, RZ. 
bankdep  Bank deposits: Share of commercial and sav-
ings bank deposits in GDP. 
-1950: Mitchell, Bordo; 
1950-: IFS, FSD. 
smcap  Stock market capitalization: Market value of 
publicly listed stocks divided by GDP. 
-1975: RZ;  
1975-: IFS, FSD. 
open  Trade openness: Share of imports plus exports 
in GDP. 
-1950: Mitchell, LM, Bordo; 
1950-: IFS, FSD. 
cgov  Government expenditure: Central government 
expenditure divided by GDP. 
-1950: Mitchell, RS, Bordo; 
1950-: IFS, FSD. 
topmtax1  Top marginal tax (statutory)  Table A2, OECD tax database 
topmtax2  Top marginal tax (statutory) and marginal tax 
rate for incomes = 5 ´ GDP/cap (Rydqvist). 
Table A2, OECD tax data-
base, Bach et al. (2005) and 
Rydqvist. 
gdppc  GDP per capita  Maddison (2006) 
pop  Population  Maddison (2006) 
Note: Bordo = Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria, (2001), FSD = Financial Structure 
Database, IFS = International Financial Statistics, LM = López-Córdoba and Meissner (2005), Mitchell 
= Mitchell (1995, 1998a, 1998b), RS = Rousseau and Sylla (2003), RZ = Rajan and Zingales (2003). 
 
 
Table A2: Income inequality data* 
 
No. of 5-year periods in... 
Country  Source  Full sample period 
Top10_1  Top1  Top10_01 
Argentina
  Alvaredo (2006)  1932-73
a,1997-2004  0  9  0 
Australia  Atkinson and Leigh (2007a)  1921-2002  13  17  13 
Canada  Saez and Veall (2005)  1920-2001  13  17  13 
Finland  Riiehlä et al. (2005)  1966-85
a,1990-2002  8  8  7 
France  Piketty (2003)  1915-1998  18  18  18 
Germany  Dell (2007)  1925-38,1944-98  13  13  13 
India
  Banerjee and Piketty (2005)  1922-1999  0  16  0 
Ireland  Nolan (2007)  1938,-43,-65,1973-2000  8  8  8 
Japan  Moriguchi and Saez (2007)  1886-2002  17
b  21  17
b 
Netherlands  Atkinson and Salverda (2005)  1914-1999  17  17  17 
New Zealand  Atkinson and Leigh (2007b)  1921-2002  17  17  17 
Spain  Alvaredo and Saez (2006)  1981-2002  5  5  5 
Sweden  Roine and Waldenström (2007) 1903-35
a,1941-2004  20  20  20 
Switzerland  Dell et al. (2007)  1933-1996  14  14  14 
United Kingdom  Atkinson and Salverda (2005)  1908-1999  14  14  14 
United States  Piketty and Saez (2003)  1913-2002  18  19  18 
a There are years with missing values in this subperiod 
b The shares-within-shares data for Japan is based on the top five percent (P95–100).  
* Due to data limitations for some of the variables, the actual country coverage for the main specifica-
tions is shown in Table A3. 
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Table A3. Actual country sample for main regressions 
  Top10_1  Top 1  Top 10_1 (w/ taxes)
b 
  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS  DFD  FDGLS 
Argentina
a      X
  X
     
Australia  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Canada  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Finland  X  X  X  X  X  X 
France  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Germany  X  X  X  X  X  X 
India      X  X     
Ireland  X    X       
Japan  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Netherlands  X  X  X  X     
New Zealand  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Spain  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Sweden  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Switzerland  X  X  X  X     
UK  X  X  X  X  X  X 
US  X  X  X  X  X  X 
a Argentina is included in the non-reported regressions using Top 1 as the dependent variable and Bank 
deposits as the measure of financial development. 
b Sample of countries for which top marginal taxes data are also available. 